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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the former jurisprudence. Perhaps timely and complete relief
can be obtained only through a legislative restatement of the
pertinent code provisions. CECIL C. LowE
MARRIAGE-CAPACITY OF MINORS TO MARRY-MIn uIM AGE-
A fifteen year old girl married without parental consent and
remained away from home four days. Her parents filed a petition
in the juvenile court alleging that the child was delinquent in
that she had absented herself from her home and her parents
without their consent. She was placed in a convent by the
juvenile court judge and was denied bail pending a hearing
on the complaint. Upon her application and that of her husband
to the supreme court, a rule was issued ordering the judge to
show cause why she should not be released from custody. The
judge responded that the marriage was illegal under Article 92,1
which forbids celebrants of marriages to marry females under
the age of sixteen or males under the age of eighteen. The
supreme court rejected the reasoning and interpreted the article
literally as a prohibition on celebrants only, and not as a declara-
tion of the minimum age for marriage. The court also relied on
Article 1122 which provides that a marriage cannot be annulled
for lack of parental consent and accordingly held that it was not
only the wife's right, but her duty to live with her husband.
State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. (2d) 837 (La. 1946).
Thus for the first time in Louisiana we have a decision by
the supreme court on the validity of a marriage in which the
celebrant violated ,the provisions of Article 92. This decision was
affirmed by implication in the case of State v. Priest," decided
eighteen days later.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870 as amended by Act 140 of 1934: "Ministers of
the gospel and magistrates, entrusted with the power of celebrating mar-
riages, are prohibited to marry any male under the age of eighteen years,
and any female under the age of sixteen, and if any of them are convicted
of having married such persons, he shall be removed from his office, if a
magistrate, or deprived forever of the right of celebrating marriage, if a
minister of the gospel." Before the 1934 amendment the ages were fourteen
and twelve respectively.
2. La. Civil Code of 1870: "The marriage of minors, contracted without
the consent of the father and mother, can not for that cause be annulled,
if It Is otherwise contracted with the formalities prescribed by law; but
such want of consent shall be a good cause for the father and mother to
disinherit their children thus married, If they think proper."
3. 27 So.(2d) 173 (La. 1946). A fifteen year old married woman was com-
mitted to the State Industrial School for Girls by the Juvenile court judge
for truancy from school. The court cited the case here noted and held a
fifteen year old married woman was not a child under the care and control
of parent, guardian, or other person within the statute providing that such
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In the chapter of the Code on the nullity of marriages, the
first three articles4 deal with marriages celebrated without free
consent of the parties or without parental consent. The next
article5 refers to "every marriage contracted under the other
incapacities or nulities enumerated in the second chapter of this
title." (Italics supplied.) Inasmuch as Article 92 is found in the
second chapter, the argument might be made that it is an expres-
sion of "incapacity or nullity." The court pointed out, however,
that the other articles in this chapter specifically indicate that
marriages celebrated in contravention of them are null, but that
no such language is found in Article 92.
Article 92 was amended by Act 140 of 1934 to raise the
prescribed ages to their present level, sixteen years for females
and eighteen years for males.7 If this were intended as the
minimum ages for marriages, it seems that Article 92 would
have been changed to show clearly such intention. An even
stronger reason for this argument is found in the amending act,
which permits a judge to authorize a marriage of persons below
those ages when extraordinary circumstances exist." If the judge
may permit such marriages, a fortiori they may recognize as
valid any marriage already entered into where extraordinary
circumstances exist. Under this view, although violation of
Article 92 is unlawful on the part of the celebrant, it does not
render the marriage null.
Assuming the instant decision to be correct, is there any-
where in our law an expression of the minimum age for mar-
riage? Article 979 speaks of the minor "who has attained the
person must send the child to school. But for the decision in the case here
noted, It would have been necessary for the court to consider whether a
fifteen year old female could be legally married.
4. Arts. 110, 111, 112, c. 4, tit. 4, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 113, La Civil Code of 1870.
6. Arts. 91 (lack of free consent), 93 (bigamy), 94 (miscegenation and
incest in the direct line), and 95 (incest in the collateral line), La. Civil Code
of 1870.
7. See note 1, supra.
8. La. Act 140 of 1934, § 2: "Provided, that this Act shall not apply, when
on application of either of the parties to a proposed marriage, any district
judge may, upon satisfactory evidence being presented to him, in case of
extraordinary circumstances when the parents or guardians of the parties
to the proposed marriage give their consent, provided, however, that said
evidence shall be presented in Chambers, and provided also, that said order
shall not contain the reasons for authorizing said marriage, and the appli-
cation shall not be a matter of record but the order shall be attached to and
made part of the marriage certificate."
9. See note 13, infra.
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competent age to marry," and according to Article 34 "the law
determines the period at which persons are sufficiently advanced
in life to be capable of contracting marriage." Neither of these
articles establish the competent age to marry. Article 36, how-
ever, separated from Article 34 only by a general article on
emancipation, established the age of puberty at twelve years for
females and fourteen for males. It is possible that the age of
puberty was intended as the minimum age at which persons
should be capable of cont: acting marriage. A strong indication of
the correctness of this view is found in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1825. At that time minors who had not reached the age of
puberty were placed under the authority of tutors, while those
above the age of puberty were placed under the authority of
curators until they were emancipated or reached the age of
majority.10 A provision of that code 11 corresponding to Article 97
of the present code provided that the minor of either sex who
had reached the competent age to marry must have received the
consent of his father and mother or the survivor of them; and if
they were both dead, the consent of his curator. Had it been con-
sidered possible for a person under the age of puberty to marry,
it seems that the article would have mentioned the tutor as well
as the curator. It is also interesting to note that this age is
consistent with Article 42 of the Louisiana Criminal Code, which
states that a female under the age of twelve is incapable of
consenting to sexual intercourse."2
The fact that the legislature in 1934 raised the ages in
Article 92 from twelve and fourteen to sixteen and eighteen
demonstrates that the legislature at least disapproved of and
sought to prevent marriages of persons under those ages. This
highly commendable objective could be attained easily by strict
enforcement of the law as it exists, or with very slight modifica-
tion of these provisions. Article 92 provides for the punishment
of celebrants who marry persons under the minimum age limit,
but the writer knows of no instance in which this article was
enforced. In addition, Articles 9718 and 9814 require applicants
10. Art. 263, La. Civil Code of 1825.
11. Art. 99, La. Civil Code of 1825.
12. This rule was well established in Louisiana jurisprudence long before
the adoption of the Louisiana Criminal Code: State v. Tilman, 30 La. Ann.
1249 (1878); State v. Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013, 43 So. 660 (1907); State v.
Folden, 135 La. 791, 66 So. 223 (1914).
13. Art. 97, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The minor of either sex, who has
attained the competent age to marry, must have received the consent of his
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for marriage licenses to give proof, of parental consent or
majority, but no sanction exists for enforcing these articles. It
seems they could be enforced by imposing serious penalties or
punishments on licensing officers who violate the provisions.
Again, both parties to the marriage could well be required to
appear before the license issuing officer. Of course, if all public
officers and persons authorized to celebrate marriages made a
conscientious attempt to abide by the articles of the Civil Code,
penalties would not be necessary and problems as are herein
discussed would not be likely to arise.
EDwIN C. SCHIL NG, JR.
NATURAL OBLIGATIONS--SUFFICIENCY As CONSIDERATION-On
November 22, 1933, Burns transferred to his first wife certain
real and personal property in settlement of an indebtedness of
fifteen thousand dollars arising from the dissolution of the
community formerly existing between them. The transfer was
accepted as full satisfaction of the debt. Subsequent to a second
marriage, Burns and his first wife entered into a second agree-
ment rescinding the first, evaluating the property previously
transferred at six thousand dollars, transferring further property
to the amount of one thousand dollars, and acknowledging a
further indebtedness on his part of eight thousand dollars, for
which three mortgage notes were given as collateral security.
Burns died without making further payments on the debt. His
widow sued to bring the mortgage notes back into the succes-
sion on the theory that they were void for want of consideration.
The defense of the first wife was that the acknowledgment of
the indebtedness was supported by a natural obligation arising
from the fact that the value of the property transferred to her
by the first agreement was not equal to the amount of the debt.
The court held that the dation en paiement extinguished the
debt in toto, as a full payment in money, and that if any obliga-
tion remained because the value of the thing given was not
equal to the amount of the debt, it was not a natural obligation,
but a moral one, and not sufficient to support a new promise to
pay. Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. (2d) 359 (1942).
father and mother or the survivor of them; and if they are both dead, the
consent of his tutor. He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to
whom he applies for permission to marry."
14. Art. 98, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Those who have attained the age of
majority, on their demanding permission to marry, must furnish proof of
their having attained that age."
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